Rule 0: No sensitive data enters the attestation layer
The kernel operates exclusively on hashes and tokens. Raw PAN, PII, PHI, and credentials never cross the attestation boundary. This is enforced at the architecture level — not by policy.
SOURCES
Payment Auth
Card data, PAN, CVV, cardholder info
PCI scope · raw PAN
Gov Systems
SSN, addresses, household data, income
PII · FISMA scope
Clinical / EHR
Patient name, MRN, diagnoses, records
PHI · HIPAA scope
Identity / Auth
Credentials, biometrics, passkeys
credential scope
hash(PAN)
SHA-256 · one-way
0x9c3f…b6
hash(SSN)
SHA-256 · one-way
0x4f21…a8
hash(MRN)
SHA-256 · one-way
0x8a91…c4
hash(cred)
SHA-256 · one-way
0xdd88…f2
↓ Only hashes and tokens cross this boundary. Raw sensitive data stays in source systems. ↓
KERNEL
Feature Capsule
Hash input vector, commit to Merkle leaf
0.42ms · hash-only
Decision Engine
Model / rule chain execution against hashes
1.18ms · deterministic
Reason Extraction
Explain codes, criteria met/unmet
2.04ms · structured
EIP-712 Sign
HSM signs typed struct with domain separator
3.41ms total · FIPS 140-3
COMMIT
Merkle Tree
Append-only, depth 14, 12K+ leaves/batch
O(log n) proof
Attestation Ledger
Immutable capsule storage, 10yr retention
archival · versioned
M-of-N Threshold
Multi-party root signing for settlement/reconcile
4 parties · O(1)
CONSUME
Operator Console
Stream, replay, verify, build evidence packs
fraud · SCA · orch · settle
Dispute / Appeal
Deterministic replay, CE 3.0, FOIA packs
43s assembly
Regulator / Auditor
Read-only verification, compliance exports
AI Act · CFPB · CMS · GAO
Counterparty
Independent proof verification, no trust needed
math is the trust